Litigation and Dispute Resolution

Oscar Wylee “improperly exploited the good nature of consumers” through its false charitable promises, the Federal Court finds

8 December, 2020

Author: Catherine Osborne
Judgement Date: 2nd December, 2015
Citation: Jundi v Saco [2015] NSWSC 1835
Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of New South Wales[1]
In brief

  • The Supreme Court of New South Wales considered an application made by a plaintiff for an equitable charge over repayment of $22,400 which she made towards a loan taken out by her then partner.
  • The Court determined the case on credit issues remarking that the plaintiff had a ‘Kardashian’ expectation, a highly developed sense of entitlement and that she failed to recognise the benefits which she had received from the defendant. His Honour remarked “This is a foolish case”.
  • In order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience, His Honour reviewed the entire financial circumstances of the parties and determined that it would not be unconscionable and inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit of the $22,4000 repayment. His Honour also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs on an indemnity basis.


Ms Leanne Jundi (the plaintiff) and Mr Anthony Saco (the defendant) met in 2012. At that time the defendant owned a property at Sadlier in New South Wales (the property). The plaintiff made no contribution to the purchase price of the property.

In June 2013, the plaintiff and the defendant married, although no marriage was registered. They purchased a Lexus motor car in the plaintiff’s name pursuant to a finance agreement between the plaintiff and ANZ Esanda. They lived together in the property for a short time before moving into the plaintiff’s parents’ home in September 2013.

In October 2013, the defendant borrowed $287,000 from the National Australia Bank (NAB) secured over the Sadlier property. The defendant used the funds to pay out a previous home loan which he had to Westpac and a personal loan to Westpac. The balance was paid into a NAB account in his name and was used to pay costs associated with the loan. On 21 October 2013, the defendant transferred $20,000 from his NAB account to pay off the plaintiff’s car loan from ANZ Esanda.

Between January and March 2013, the defendant was unemployed while undertaking training in fascia and gutter work. From January 2014, the plaintiff made mortgage repayments to the NAB in the order of $800 per fortnight which totaled $22,400. The defendant at this time spent some money to set up a company for, and to purchase equipment for, his new guttering business.

The pair separated in February 2015. The plaintiff then commenced proceedings seeking to recover from the defendant the repayments of $22,400.

Supreme Court decision

Justice Pembroke found that whilst it was true that the plaintiff had contributed the amount of $22,400 in repayment of the defendant’s NAB loan, the defendant’s contributions to the financial wellbeing of the plaintiff in fact exceeded that sum. His Honour noted that the defendant’s contributions included paying the amount of $20,000 for the plaintiff’s car loan, the cost of incorporating his company and the purchase of equipment for that company. His Honour also found that the plaintiff had taken, at least indirectly, $27,000 from the account of the defendant’s company for wages based on the fact that she prepared invoices for the company. There was however no evidence that she had created any invoices for the company. The plaintiff conceded in evidence that she did not contribute in any meaningful way to the business of the company and that she had no experience as a company director.

His Honour noted that although the plaintiff’s claim was confined to a claim for an equitable charge, the principle upon which such a remedy is based is a flexible one which is imposed in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience. His Honour observed that the plaintiff’s case ignored the question of whether it would be unconscionable and inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit of the $22,400. His Honour noted that the defendant had paid $40,000 to cover the costs of the wedding and that the plaintiff had made demands for holidays, expensive clothes, extravagant nights and expensive dinners, not to mention designer shoes, clothes and trips to beauty salons. His Honour considered the entirety of the financial circumstances of the parties in the context of which the payment of $22,400 was made in order to determine whether the retention of the benefit was against conscience.

His Honour noted that:

“Everything about the plaintiff’s evidence suggested to me that she had a Kardashian expectation of her rights and a highly developed sense of entitlement. She failed to recognise the benefits which she had received or the unfairness of the single minded pursuit of her claim against the defendant…the realities of life and the law were absent from her comprehension”.2

His Honour commented on the sorry sequence of events which led to the case coming to a hearing. In deciding whether the defendant should be entitled to costs on an indemnity basis, his Honour formed the view that the proceedings were always hopeless and should never have been commenced or maintained. His Honour said he was concerned by the plaintiff’s evidence, which was motivated by desire for vindication following the breakdown of her relationship with the defendant. His Honour said the claim was misconceived insofar as it relied upon a resulting trust or a constructive trust. His Honour recognised that the plaintiff’s solicitor had provided the usual certification pursuant to s 347 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) and that he did not suggest for one moment that the plaintiff’s solicitor did not hold that view honestly.

His Honour concluded that the interests of justice are not assisted by unmeritorious claims brought by plaintiffs with unrealistic expectations. His Honour dismissed the summons and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs on an indemnity basis, noting that not only was the claim hopeless but that the plaintiff refused to accept the defendant’s offer to pay the full amount of her claim as soon as she had articulated its amount.


This case serves as a warning to greedy or unmeritorious plaintiffs that the Equity Divison of the Supreme Court of New South Wales will impose equitable principles in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience. The case also reinforces that plaintiffs who bring hopeless cases and refuse to accept reasonable settlement offers expose themselves to indemnity costs orders.

  1. Justice Pembroke.
  2. Jundi v Saco [2015] NSWSC 1835 at [19].

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