Vijay Edwards
Principal
The plaintiff suffered serious injuries when his bicycle collided with an orange mesh barricade erected on a shared pedestrian and cycle path at Aspley before dawn on 18 December 2009. On the previous day, workers on behalf of Brisbane City Council (Council) had evacuated part of the footpath to undertake underground works on the water main. Upon completion of those works, the excavation was backfilled and the path re-concreted. The barricade was erected temporarily to protect the newly laid concrete while it cured overnight. The barricade did not extend across the full width of the path, but projected from the roadside edge of the footpath.
On the day of the incident, at about 4:00am the plaintiff left his home to go on one of his regular early-morning bike rides. At around 4:20am, he collided with the barricade. Upon impact, he lost control of his bicycle and fell, impaling his left eye on a metal stake supporting one corner of the barricade. The stake penetrated his eye socket and entered his cranial cavity. Despite the severity of his injuries, the plaintiff remained conscious for a period, moved his bicycle further along the path, returned towards the barricade, and removed the stake before collapsing. He sustained the loss of an eye, fractures to the orbital region, and a traumatic brain injury.
Emergency services, including ambulance, police and fire personnel, attended the scene shortly after the incident. Owing to the severity of his injuries, the plaintiff has no recollection of the events leading to the collision.
The plaintiff alleged that the collision was caused by inadequate lighting, poor visibility, and the absence of adequate warning signage or delineation around the barricade. It was alleged that those matters prevented him from appreciating the nature and extent of the obstruction until he was too close to avoid it.
At first instance, the Council was found to have been negligent. However, the claim was dismissed because the primary judge held that s 36 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applied and that the Council’s conduct did not meet the high threshold required for liability under that provision. The plaintiff appealed.
The Queensland Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $675,926.77 plus interest.
The Court rejected the contention that s 36 is confined to causes of actions founded on for breach of statutory duty. Rather, it held that the provision extends to common law negligence claims where liability arises from the exercise, or failure to exercise, a public authority’s functions. The Court considered that interpretation consistent with the text of the legislation, the explanatory materials and the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report.
The Court held that the Council’s management of the worksite formed part of its statutory functions. ts responsibilities for the construction, maintenance and repair of public infrastructure necessarily extended to securing the worksite while the newly laid concrete cured. Accordingly, the erection and maintenance of the barricade fell within the scope of the Council’s statutory powers and functions.
However, the Court disagreed with the primary judge on the critical question arising under s 36(2). It concluded that the Council’s conduct was so unreasonable that no public authority in its position could properly regard it as a reasonable exercise of its functions.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court placed significant weight on the absence of reflective warning signs, the lack of hazard lighting, the failure to identify a safe alternative route around the obstruction, and the departure from appliable manuals, guidelines and Council procedures. The Court also noted evidence that simple and inexpensive precautions were available and that Council personnel accepted warning signs directing users safely around the obstruction should have been provided. As the Court observed at [127]:
… In my view it is difficult to accept that a public authority could reasonably consider that it was a proper exercise of its functions or powers here (if it was not providing hazard lighting or other precaution) not to provide at least reflective signs providing advance warning of the barricade and the need to divert to another safely identified passage. The risk of harm to cyclists of the catastrophic kind suffered in this case, while described by the primary judge as moderate, was nonetheless not remote.
An important aspect of the decision concerns the manner in which a plaintiff may establish that an authority’s conduct satisfies the standard in s 36(2).
The Court rejected the proposition that a plaintiff must adduce evidence of the practices of other councils or public authorities before the statutory threshold can be satisfied. At trial, considerable attention had been directed to the absence of evidence as to whether other local authorities would have considered the Council’s conduct reasonable. On appeal, the Court held that this misconceived the nature of the inquiry mandated by s 36(2).
The question is not whether other authorities would, in fact, have acted differently. Rather, the inquiry is whether the impugned conduct was so unreasonable that no public authority having the same functions could properly consider it to be a reasonable exercise of those functions. In that regard, the Court stated at [116]-[117]:
The appellant had the onus of establishing his claim by the standard imposed by s 36(2).
That said, there is no evidence that any local authority with the functions of the Council could have considered the provision of the barricade as it was with the combination of having no advance or other reflective warning signs, no direction to an alternative path and no local lighting provided, as a proper exercise of the function.
The Court emphasised that this assessment is undertaken by reference to a hypothetical or notional public authority. It is an objective evaluative exercise for the court on the evidence before it. While evidence of the practices of other public authorities may be relevant in a particular case, it is not a necessary precondition to establishing liability under s 36(2).
In determining whether the statutory threshold had been met, the Court relied on the factual circumstances of the incident, the expert evidence, applicable industry guidance and the Council’s own policies and procedures. These matters provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation upon which to assess whether the Council’s conduct fell outside the range of conduct that could properly be regarded as a reasonable exercise of its functions. As the Court observed at [126]:
…In this case applicable standards were tendered and relied on. The Council’s own standards were tendered and relied on. The standards often involve matters of judgement and assessment and accordingly might in any specific situation leave open a range of acts, treatments or precautions which may properly be considered a reasonable exercise of the function or power. But that is not this case.
The decision is significant because it confirms that a plaintiff is not required to undertake the often difficult and potentially costly exercise of obtaining evidence from comparable councils or other public authorities. Instead, the reasonableness of the impugned conduct may be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the incident, applicable standards and guidelines, internal policies and procedures, expert evidence, and the nature and magnitude of the risk confronting the authority.
For public authorities and their insurers in Queensland, the decision highlights the importance of having and following appropriate operational procedures, policies and industry standards. Those documents may provide critical evidence of the range of responses reasonably open to an authority and are likely to play a central role in the assessment required by s 36(2).
Aimee Topfer (Lawyer)
Zara Hawkes (Researcher)