Peter Hunt
Consultant
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Chowdhury [2025] NSWSC 1392 on 26 November 2025.
The Claimant was involved in a motor accident on 11 November 2024. He sustained a fractured right ankle and a left wrist injury.
The Claimant subsequently sought to recover the cost of caring for his three cats as a treatment expense within the statutory benefits regime in Part 3.4 of MAIA. The care included feeding the cats, changing the litter tray and filling the cats’ water bowl.
The Insurer declined to meet the cost of the Claimant’s pet care on the grounds that that kind of care did not fall within the definition of “attendant care services” and it follows that the pet care was not “treatment and care” within the meaning of s 1.4 of MAIA
At first instance, Member Cassidy concluded that services to assist the Claimant care for his cats were “attendant care services“. The Insurer sought judicial review in the Supreme Court.
Section 3.24 of the MAIA states, in general terms, that an injured person is entitled to statutory benefits for treatment and care provided to the injured person, provided the treatment and care is reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the motor accident.
Section 1.4 of MAIA provides a definition of “treatment and care“, which includes an exhaustive list of eleven types of treatment and care. One of those items is “attendant care services“.
Section 1.4 of MAIA defines “attendant care services” as “services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services“.
Breaking Down the Definition of “Attendant Care Services”
Justice McHugh, at [16], observed that the words “…services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks” are the operative part of the definition and disclose a purposive intent.
More specifically:
His Honour added that “attendant care services” includes services that fall outside the concepts of “personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services“.
In other words, a task can be an “attendant care service” even if it is not personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services.
Responding to the Insurer’s Arguments
His Honour responded to the arguments raised by the Insurer as follows:
1. The Insurer argued that damages are not recoverable at common law for the value of gratuitous pet care services
2. MAIA uses similar or identical language to the Motor Accidents Act 1988 and the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 which were designed to regulate gratuitous care claims only and should be understood not to extent to pet care
3. The objects and secondary materials for MAIA are inconsistent with any intention to expand common law rights and express an intention to reduce scheme costs
Conclusion
Justice McHugh, therefore, concluded that:
The Insurer’s application was, therefore, dismissed.
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Chowdhury provides some useful insights into how treatment and care disputes should be assessed.
Pet Care
Firstly, and most obviously, given this decision, a claim to recover the cost of providing care to pets will ordinarily constitute a claim for “attendant care services” which is recoverable pursuant to s 3.24(1) of MAIA.
Whether the claimed pet care costs are reasonable and necessary and related to the accident depends on the facts of each case. Any dispute can be referred to the Commission as a medical assessment matter.
“For the Injured Person”
Section 3.24(1) provides that an injured person may recover expenses incurred in connection with providing treatment and care “for the injured person“.
There have been PIC decisions which suggest that the words “for the injured person” in s 3.24(1) mean that the treatment and care must actually be provided to the claimant. See, for example, Warner v IAG.
In obiter remarks, however, McHugh JA interpreted “for the injured person” more broadly by finding that the treatment and care must be for the claimant’s benefit, rather than directly to the claimant’s person or exclusively for their benefit.
The distinction was important in this dispute because the attendant care services were directed to the Claimant’s pets but they were, more broadly, for the Claimant’s general benefit. He got to enjoy having his cats and he didn’t risk further injury by looking after them himself.
“Reasonableness”
Justice McHugh proceeded on the footing, agreed between the parties, that the question was whether the Claimant was reasonably able to perform the tasks without treatment or care, as opposed to whether the task itself was reasonable.
“Everyday Tasks”
In obiter remarks, his Honour observed that there were two ways of interpreting the words “…and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” in the definition of “attendant care services“:
There have been a number of PIC decisions which proceed on the basis that the concept of “everyday tasks” operates to limit what constitutes an “attendant care service“.
Our Case Notes on those decisions can be found in the links below:
Based on his Honour’s obiter remarks, however, it is possible that the words “…and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” operate to expand the ordinary English meaning of “everyday tasks“. How that possible interpretation might be applied in practice is yet to be seen.
If you would like to discuss this case note, please don’t hesitate to get in touch with CTP Practice Group Leader Peter Hunt today.